AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISM CODE
THE INTERNATIONAL SAFETY
MANAGEMENT CODE
(A LITTLE BIT OF HISTORY TO THE BIRTH OF ISM)
In 1912, on her
maiden voyage, westbound across the
For those who did not see the movie or never got past the fictitious love story, the following a brief description of the events leading up the disaster.
The RMS
Titanic was constructed with the most up-to-date technology and
materials available at the time. So confident of the vessel’s design, the
owner’s declared her to be “unsinkable”.
This sort of boast was not without merit. The vessel had a radical new design, which incorporated transverse bulkheads along the length of the vessel. These could be made watertight by sealing each compartment by use of watertight doors fitted to every access through the bulkhead.
Unfortunately, the bulkheads did not go all the way up to the uppermost continuous deck (usually well above the normal waterline), so as one compartment flooded, the water was able to pour over the bulkhead and start to fill the adjacent compartment. This continued until the vessel lost enough buoyancy to sink.
The ship designers wanted to make the ship look pleasing to the eye of prospective passengers. Therefore, they determined to provide only sufficient lifeboats in davits to accommodate first class passengers. Some additional lifeboats were secured above deckhouses, which they determined could be used on existing davits, once the original boats had been launched. There were still not enough boats to accommodate the entire ship’s compliment.
Vessel's sailing across the
As was seen in
the movie, the ship owner wanted to make a big impression on the maiden voyage
passengers, by making a very fast passage to
With 20/20 hindsight, we can all see that the Titanic's Captain issued the orders to proceed at speed at night, and as a result collided with an iceberg. Aware that the full responsibility for these orders was his, he is assumed to have followed the honorable tradition of "going down with his ship".
The iceberg was spotted moments before the collision. Had the ship hit the iceberg right on the bow, the ship may have survived, having damaged only one or two compartments nearest the bow. However, the officer on watch, having been informed of an iceberg ahead, attempted to avoid it by putting the rudders hard over. All this accomplished was that the ship slid down the side of the iceberg, sustaining damage to the hull in several compartments.
Once these compartments had fully flooded, the ship was low enough in the water that the flooded compartments overflowed into the next intact compartment and the fate of the ship was sealed.
In 1914, the leading maritime nations met and developed a set of international regulations called SOLAS Regulations (Safety Of Life At Sea). Lessons learned from the Titanic tragedy were incorporated into the regulations, such as:
· Enough lifeboats for everyone onboard, and able to be easily launched;
· Watertight transverse bulkheads reaching all the way up to the uppermost continuous deck;
· Cross flooding capability for passenger ships, to enable them to remain upright and trimmed so that all lifeboats can be launched safely.
Over the years,
the SOLAS regulations have been upgraded as a result of
improving technology, but also in response to other tragic incidents up to the
sinking of the Herald of Free
Enterprise.
The formulation of international regulations for safety and pollution prevention were taken over by the United Nations. All nations with maritime interests join together to form the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Their headquarters are in London (UK), and they have various sub-committees in different parts of the world that specialize in some aspect of marine safety or pollution prevention.
Over the years
since W.W.II, there has been a rise in offshore oil exploration and production.
Starting in the shallow waters around the
This offshore exploration/production industry has not been immune from catastrophic tragedy. An oil production platform named Piper Alpha caught fire and resulted in the deaths of many offshore oil workers, most of which were not traditional seafarers.
Prior to the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster, the prevailing wisdom in the formulation of safety regulations was to focus on the technical and hardware aspects of potential causes for disasters.
Research had been conducted on accidents and incidents in many industries and their results concluded that:
·
20% of recorded accident/incidents were hardware related (i.e.
technical failures)
·
80% of recorded accidents/incidents were software related (i.e.
human factors)
However, safety and related regulations were:
·
80% hardware related
·
20% software related
Obviously, the existing regime of inspection and enforcement of regulations related to mostly hardware. The level of compliance to safety and environmental protection was not up to the anticipations of the drafters of these regulations.
Additional
regulations such as mandatory Safety Case development for offshore
exploration and production facilities in the
This type of
regulations created by individual countries, increase financial expenditures of
'for profit' companies and have a direct effect on their 'bottom line'. In the
wake of the Exxon Valdez incident, the
This legislation had the effect of forcing most 'oil majors' to divest themselves of their own tanker fleets in order to protect themselves from possible unlimited liability in a pollution incident. Other tanker operators have decided not to trade to US waters to avoid the additional expenses and liabilities.
In the aftermath of the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster, it was clearly not in the interests of the international shipping community to be subjected to the same type of regulatory requirements imposed on the offshore and oil tanker industry; especially in an economic climate that could not support higher freight rates to pay for additional safety equipment and assessments.
Maritime governments and leading maritime experts, under the auspices of IMO concluded that in order to avoid further unilaterally imposed legislation being forced upon the marine industry every time a tragic incident occurred in some country's territorial waters, the marine industry should develop an international standard of maritime safe working practice and management to regulate themselves.
In 1989 IMO came out with Resolution A647, which adopted the ISM Code. The principles of the code are for the safe operation and management of ships and pollution prevention.
The maritime industry is very diverse. In order for companies to operate passenger ships, bulk carriers, tankers, MODU's and high speed ferries under the same set of guidelines as a traditional freighter requires that the actual wording of the code be general and flexible to allow it to be incorporated into the existing management and safety culture of each ship and corporate structure.
As there was already an internationally recognized standard for quality management for the manufacturing and services industries (ISO-900 Series), it made sense to use the appropriate elements of the existing standard to formulate the ISM Code.
The ISM Code consists of a preamble and 13 separate elements:
·
Preamble
·
General
·
Safety and Environmental
Protection Policy
·
Company Responsibilities
and Authority
·
Designated Person
·
Master's Responsibility and
Authority
·
Resources and Personnel
·
Development of Plans for
Shipboard Operation
·
Emergency Preparedness
·
Reports and Analysis of
Non-conformities, Accidents and Hazardous Occurrences
·
Maintenance of Ship and
Equipment
·
Documentation
·
Company Verification,
Review and Evaluation
·
Certification, Verification
and Control
The ISM Code is a set of guidelines on how to develop, implement and monitor a Safety Management System to ensure safe operation of ships and pollution prevention. From these guidelines, a prudent and safety conscious ship manager will incorporate all the elements into his/her existing management system.
1.0 GENERAL
The development of a safety management system compliant to the ISM Code need not be radically different from any existing safety management system or quality management system already in existence. The code identifies within its elements the items that must be incorporated to be fully compliant.
It is far better to modify a management system that is both familiar to the user and already fits the safety and environmental culture of the company. Therefore, there is no need to ‘re-invent the wheel’ when developing an ISM compliant management system.
It is very common to see a safety management system in combination with a quality management system. This allows a company not only to comply with the regulatory requirements, but take advantage of all the quality aspects to improve their end product or service.
A Company may also elect to follow some form of quality management practice without having to obtain external certification and oversight. The voluntary implementation may be sufficient to obtain improvements, without the additional expense and disruption of having the management system certified for compliance by an independent audit regime.
The successful implementation of a safety management system is dependent on continued employee involvement at all levels of the company, both shore-based and offshore staff, who are convinced of its purpose and need.
2.0 SAFETY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY
The main ‘buzz
words’ of the IMO resolution regarding the ISM Code was “Safer Ships and Cleaner Seas”.
Therefore, this policy should capture management’s commitment to ensure safety of life at sea, prevention of threat to life, property and the environment, especially the marine environment.
The development of this policy should be with the commitment of the most senior decision-makers in the company. Without the active involvement of top level management, it will be impossible to motivate other company employees to contribute towards a successful objective.
3.0 COMPANY
RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY
The maritime industry has a long tradition of limiting their liability, obligations and responsibilities in regards to ship safety and environmental degradation. Traditionally the maximum liability an owner could be subjected to was the sum value of the ship and its cargo. Courts in several countries of the world attempted to increase the scope of liability to cover other vessels belonging to the same owner. In defense against this additional liability, ship owners incorporated their ships into separate numbered companies, owned by shell companies registered in obscure island states, where commercial laws were designed to provide confidentiality and privacy for true owner of the ship. A classic case of this was the tanker Torrey Canyon that ran aground in UK in the 60’s, causing considerable environmental damage from the oil spilt. To this day, the real owners have never been identified and the UK taxpayer was saddled with the cost of the clean up.
The ISM Code clearly requires the identification of the owner, or if the ship is managed by a third party, the identity of the party that will take on the responsibilities of the owner in regards to safety and pollution prevention. Most countries require each ship entering its coastal waters to provide proof that it has sufficient liability insurance to cover a major accident or clean up any environmental damage.
It is generally accepted that when a company documents it responsibilities and authority to act under this element of the code, that providing company organization charts and written job descriptions of all employees with safety and environmental responsibilities is the simplest method of compliance to the code.
4.0 DESIGNATED
PERSONS
Having a person designated by and reporting to the highest levels of management on any deficiencies in the safety management system is a very new concept in the Marine Industry.
From the legal standpoint, ship managers have in the past been able to avoid personal and corporate liability in serious incidents of marine safety and pollution, by claiming ignorance of the day-to-day operation of their vessels. In fact, they were also able to use a claim of “Crew Negligence” to obtain money from their insurance coverage if a vessel was lost or damaged due to the actions of the crew.
The Code has effectively closed this comfortable loophole and by the use of the Designated Person, rightly concludes that upper management are aware of deficiencies in the SMS, crew and operational capability of their ships, and therefore have an obligation to implement corrective action before a disaster occurs.
During the investigation of the Herald of Free Enterprise incident, it was determined that management pressure to maintain sailing schedules forced the crew to leave the ferry dock before the bow doors were properly secured. Although the master of the ship was principally responsible for the loss of passenger’s lives, the Managing Director and Chairman of the Ferry Company were also charged with manslaughter in this incident.
5.0 MASTER’S
RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY
Here the code makes the company responsible for defining the Master’s responsibilities in regards to implementing the company’s safety and environmental protection policy, motivating the crew, issuing appropriate orders and instructions and reporting deficiencies to shore based management.
An additional
requirement states that management must clearly establish that the Master has “overriding
authority and the responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and
pollution prevention”.
An example of this would be the Amoco Cadiz incident, where a loaded tanker ran aground off the French coast because the master did not have the authority to hire salvage tugs to tow him clear of the rocks when there was still time to do so.
6.0 RESOURCES
AND PERSONNEL
This part of the code obligates the company to ensure that at all employees involved in the SMS, both ashore and afloat shall be appropriately trained and qualified to perform their duties and have an adequate understanding of the codes, guidelines and regulations relevant to marine industry management.
For companies employing personnel who do not read and write English, they are further required to ensure that these employees receive the appropriate information in a language understood by them.
Regarding the fire aboard the ferry Scandinavian Star, it was established during the inquiry into the incident, that crewmembers of different nationalities were unable to communicate in a common language during the emergency, either between themselves or with the passengers. Valuable time was lost in responding to the incident with misunderstood instructions and lack of understanding of a common language.
7.0 DEVELOPMENT
OF PLANS FOR SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS
This part of the code require the company to document procedures, instructions, checklists etc. for the carrying out of critical and hazardous operations in regards to safety and pollution prevention. This element is very similar to Process Control in a quality management system. The essential point here is that trained and qualified personnel carry out key tasks in a manner that preventative actions are in place and personnel are able to respond to and correct any non-conformities and hazardous situations should they occur.
This particular element of the code is probably the most subjected to abuse and verbose. It was not the intent of the authors of the code to require ship owners to produce mountains of paper work in the form of written procedures, checklists and other verification records for every shipboard operation. The intent was to allow each ship owner to determine what key tasks were considered important to his operation and develop appropriate procedures. In general, ship management companies like to have written procedures for nearly every task they do. It is not the fault of the code if the end product is very large. It is sufficient to concentrate on key items and ensure that appropriate personnel are properly trained to perform their job functions.
8.0 EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS
This part of the code requires each company to establish procedures to identify, describe and respond to potential emergency situations. These usually take the form of risk identification, emergency preparedness training (EPT), and emergency response plans.
The basic philosophy behind this element is to ensure that personnel will respond appropriately in any foreseen emergency situation, be familiar with the response actions and the emergency equipment to be used.
As it is impossible to plan a response to every possible emergency, the focus should be concentrated on those incidents where it is felt that there might be a possible chance that such an incident might occur.
9.0 REPORTS
& ANALYSIS OF NON-CONFORMITIES, ACCIDENTS & HAZARDOUS OCCURRENCES
The SMS should include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations are reported to the company, analyzed/investigated as appropriate with the objective of continuously improving safety and pollution prevention.
What is important here is the dissemination of information throughout the company. The Designated Person should always ensure that the appropriate level of management be kept informed of any incidents. Also it is necessary to inform employees of incidents or precursors of incidents (near misses), in a manner that will allow them to benefit from the mistakes or failings of others.
In order to make this system work for the greater benefit of the company; there must be a culture of ‘reward for failure’. In other words to encourage the reporting of a near miss situation from which others can learn, it is important not to punish the person or persons reporting the incident. A full and honest investigation and analysis of an incident can be beneficial to the company and to its employees whether they were involved in the incident or not.
10.0 MAINTENANCE
OF THE SHIP AND EQUIPMENT
Procedures should be established which ensure that maintenance; repairs and relevant surveys are carried out in a planned, safe and timely manner. Personnel responsible for ship operations should be familiar with the appropriate Flag State and class requirements, survey status and requirements for arranging surveys/inspections etc.
Many companies have a computerized Planned Maintenance System (PMS) which enables management to monitor levels of maintenance, provide adequate technical support and order required spare parts in advance of planned maintenance routines etc.
A good PMS will ensure that the ship is well maintained, always seaworthy and provided with all necessary spare parts and tools in a timely manner.
Important in this element is having routine maintenance performed to a set standard (i.e. to the equipment manufacturer’s recommendations). Incidents have occurred in the past, where a much longer than recommended time interval between engine servicing has taken place in an effort to save money by the ship owner. For example a main engine requiring a recommended service interval of 8000 hours is run for 10,000 hours before servicing. In the past, if a catastrophic failure of the engine had occurred, it might still be possible to claim against the ship’s insurance. With a fully documented PMS subject to the monitoring of the company management, it would be unlikely that an insurance claim would be paid on a similar incident.
11.0 DOCUMENTATION
This element is very similar to the Document Control element in a quality management system. The main purpose is to control documentation relevant to the SMS, safety and environmental protection. The caution here is to refrain from making the documentation too excessive.
From the shipboard aspect, the requirement should be to identify the required documentation, identify the location, custodian responsible for a particular item and have a procedure in place to ensure the document’s validity and removal of obsolete documents.
IMO, Flag State, Coastal State and Class rules require either original or approved copies of documents to be onboard the vessel. Approved copies generally have a red ink approval stamp from the appropriate authority.
12.0 COMPANY
VERIFICATION, REVEIW AND EVALUATION
The code requires management to make periodic reviews, evaluations and verifications of the various parts of the safety management system. The intent here is to ensure the SMS implemented, effective, relevant and to identify areas requiring improvement.
The review process starts with internal checks, inspections and audits of all levels of the company having safety and environmental responsibilities. These can be conducted in conjunction with existing quality management audits and technical surveys and inspections.
Personnel independent of the area being audited should be selected to conduct any ISM related audit. A management review board, consisting of upper level management should conduct objective evaluations of the audit results.
Any corrective action or improvements obtained from a management review should be recorded and personnel assigned to conduct follow up actions for their implementation.
During the first couple of years of implementing a SMS compliant to the ISM code, companies generally find that on all levels of management there is identified a lack of training in various parts of the employee’s job function. Mainly new employees fail to get adequate induction/orientation training when they are first hired, and when employees are promoted, they fail to get additional training that would make them more effective at their new position.
13.0 CERTIFICATION,
VERIFICATION AND CONTROL
In order to comply fully with the ISM Code, it is required that an organization (DNV, ABS, Lloyds etc.) recognized by the flag state administration (Panama, Bahamas, Liberia etc.) conduct audits of each ship and the management entity that is named as the owner or acting on behalf of the owner.
An annual audit is conducted on the Head Office and a random sample of area offices. The ships are initially audited and a 5-year certificate issued. A compliance audit is conducted during the mid-term of this certificate.
The ships can be subject to random audit by any port/coastal state administration in which the ship is operating. If they are not satisfied with the level of compliance to ISM, they can detain the ship and call in the organization that issued the certification to re-audit and if necessary cancel the certification.
Various flag states have additional requirements over and above the basic ISM code requirements (Liberia).
Of the ships around the world that have been detained for ISM related deficiencies; most have been allowed to sail in ballast (therefore not trading) after a re-audit by the original certifying organization and after all major deficiencies have been rectified and the vessel considered seaworthy.
All such vessels have been cleared for a voyage to a specific port, and that port authority is informed in advance of the vessel arriving of the nature of the deficiencies outstanding.
DRUG
AND ALCOHOL POLICY
Although the ISM Code does not contain a requirement for a company drug and alcohol policy, it is a common requirement of charterers in the tanker trade and related services. Some coastal states such as USA have very stringent requirements and regulations covering marine operations in their waters, so it is prudent to formulate, publish and enforce a policy that will be acceptable to charterers and coastal states.
CONCLUSION
Managers of successful companies have always been managing commercial risk with the intention of creating capital and profits for their shareholders and investors. Managing risk in regards to safety and environmental protection is now also a priority with the ISM Code. There are no absolutes. In any commercial venture, there are elements of risk, which have to be managed. Just the same is true of safety and environmental protection. We cannot exclude the risk but we can manage it in a systematic way, that will encourage preventive and proactive policies and procedures, rather than focusing on reactive after-the–fact remedial actions.
The creation of a safe and environmentally friendly work place is a journey of incremental improvements over time. Perfection is neither expected nor is it either possible or affordable, but continuously improving knowledge, training and technology will take us closer to it when we are all committed toward that goal.